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TORTS
SECTION I-Concurrent Negligence, Causal Connection
and the Rule of Massie v. Firmstoae, Violation of
Statute as Negligence Per Se, Death by Wrongful Act,
Surface Water and Tort Liability, Duty Towards Infants, Wilful or Wanton Negligence, Last Clear Chance.
Proximate Cause, Concurrent Negligence. In Petcosky
v. Bovman,1 the Supreme Court of Appeals found that there
was sufficient evidence before the jury to uphold a verdict finding both parties to an auto accident concurrently negligent as to
a third party who subsequently collided with the automobile of
one of the joint tort-feasors. It was conceded by both defendants that the negligence which had caused the first collision also
proximately caused the second collision, but the defendants
argued that there was not sufficient evidence to support the
finding of concurrent negligence. Having disposed of this contention by careful examination of the evidence, which was
sufficient to indicate negligence on the part of both parties, the
Supreme Court of Appeals allowed the judment against the joint
tort-feasors to stand, under the well-settled rule that the liability
of concurrent tort-feasors is joint and several.2
Causal Connection, Evidence Sufficient to Establish.
The Rule of Massie v. Firmstone. It is elementary law that
an act of negligence, standing by itself, is not actionable. To
serve as the basis of a cause of action, a causal connection must
be established between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury.8 Prosser refers to the "but for" or "sine qua non"
rule4 as an expression of this idea and as a test to determine the
existence of such causal connection. In the case of Edmonds v.
Mecklenburg Electric Cooperative"the quantum of evidence necessary to establish causal connection appears to have reached a
minimum. In rendering its decision in this case, the Supreme
1 197 Va. 240, 89 S.E.2d 4 (1955).

2Luck v. Rice, 182 Va. 373, 29 S.E.2d 238 (1944); Milam v. Settle, 127
W.Va. 271, 32 S.E.2d 269 (1944). Prosser, Handbook of the Law of
Torts (1941), 329.
8 13 M.J., Negligence 523.
4Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941), 322.
5 197 Va. 540,90 SJE.2d 188 (1955).

Court of Appeals has made a significant clarification of the doctrine of Massie v. Firmstone, which clarification happily will
outweigh the ,ultimate decision. The plaintiff had testified that
her child was walking or running along a rocky downhill path
to an outdoor privy, that the child fell in the path at a point near
the hole, which was about three feet from the path, that the
plaintiff picked up the child and "when, all I know is I was in the
hole the next thing." She had fainted from severe pain., and
when she recovered, she was sitting on the side of the hole with
her daughter in her arms, her right leg crumpled under her and
her left leg dangling in the hole. Defendant argued that on the
basis of plaintiff's testimony, her case could be no stronger than
her personal evidence made it, under the doctrine of Massie v.
Firmstone. The court ruled that under Massie v. Firmstone the
plaintiff would not be concluded unless her evidence ".... clearly

and unequivocally testifies to facts which show as a matter of
law that he has no case . . .- 7 In other words, the court indicates
that a plaintiff by his personal testimony, may effectively bar his
right to recover, but in order to do so his testimony must be
"clear and unequivocal." If the plaintiff's personal testimony
does not clearly and unequivocally show that he has no case, a
jury question is presented to consider the plaintiff's testimony
along with all other evidence. This is a valuable exposition of
the rule of Massie v. Firmstone and the most definitive yet pronounced by the court.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, however, as pointed
out by Justice Spratley in his dissent, that no causal connection
between the hole and the accident was established. At no time
did the plaintiff say she stepped in the hole. "She frankly said she
did not know what happened." 8 In the absence of other evidence
establishing causation, the jury was allowed to reach a verdict
based not on evidence, but upon implication, supposition, or
speculation. It is possible that in reversing the trial court's action
setting aside the verdict, the Supreme Court of Appeals has encouraged future litigation relying on nebulous evidence to establish causation.
6 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922).

197 Va. 540, 543; 90 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1955).
8 197 Va. 540, 544, 90 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1955).
7

Violation of Statute as Negligence Per Se. It is well
settled that where the violation of a statute or ordinance is the
proximate cause of the injury, or contributed thereto, the wrongdoer is liable therefor." And Virginia has provided by statute
that damages sustained from the violation of a statute may be
recovered.1 But it would be going too far to conclude that in
Virginia such violation would constitute negligence as a matter
of law, as many qualifications and exceptions have been made in
the cases.11 Indeed, in West Virginia it has been held that even
where the violation is the proximate cause of an injury, such
violation is only prima facie actionable. 12 The four cases decided
in Virginia in 1955 which touch upon this proposition indicate
that the Virginia rule is in accord with that expressed in West
Virginia. "The arbitrary classification of all branches of statute
as negligence per se or no negligence at all leaves too little flexibility for the standard of reasonable care."' 18
Bro'wn v. Damron14 was a case wherein the plaintiff was
found contributorily negligent as a matter of law for his failure
to yield the right of way as required by Section 46-240, Code of
Virginia (1950). It is clear from the discussion of the court, however, that, finding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the court did not rely solely upon the statute, for it
repeats the proposition that whether contributory negligence is
a question for the jury or one of law for the court depends on
the facts of the case, citing Nehi Bottling Co. v. Lambert, 196
Va. 949 at 955, 86 S.E.2d 156 at 159: "In other words where
reasonable men can draw but one inference from the facts, negligence becomes a question of law."
In Hopson v. Goolsby 15 the court upheld the lower court's
action in refusing an instruction offered by the defendant which
would have found the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law for her failure to cross the street at an intersection, as
required by Section 46-243 of the Code. The court agreed with
the plaintiff that to have crossed at the intersection under the
9 13 M.J., Negligence, S15 and cases therein cited.
10 Va. Code $8-652, (1950) as revised.
11 See note 9, supra.
12 Morris v. Wheeling, -- W.Va.-, 82 S.E.2d 536 (1954).
'3 Prosser, Handbook of the Laso of Torts, (1941), 276.
14

197 Va. 309, 89 S.E.2d 54 (1955).

15 196 Va. 832, 86 S.E.2d 149 (1955).

peculiar conditions of this case would have been more dangerous
than at the crossing she chose later, and the court held that her
violation of the statute in this instance was not negligence. Thus,
we see that violation of a statute in Virginia sets up, at most, a
rebuttable presumption of negligence.
On the other hand, a refusal of a trial court to inform the jury
of a statute's command was held prejudicial error in Marshall v.
Shaw. 1" The plaintiff had requested an instruction setting forth a
driver's duty under Code Section 46-244 to yield the right of way
to a pedestrian crossing a highway within any clearly marked
crosswalk ...except when traffic is being regulated by an officer or traffic regulating device. The defendant had a verdict
which was reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court of Appeals, which repeated the rule in Lucas v. Craft,17 and Reese v.
Snelson:18
The language and intent of the general assembly is so
plainly expressed in the statute that it needs no interpretation
or construction. It means what is said.
Thus, while the court acknowledges that a standard of duty
set up by the Legislature is subject to rebuttal according to a
particular fact situation, yet where the Legislative standard is
clear, it will be prejudicial error to deny the jury the benefit
of the statute's guidance.
The laudable flexibility of the Virginia view is further demonstrated in Gough v. Shaner, Admr.,19 an action for damages for
death by wrongful act. Here, the concept of violation of statute
as negligence per se ran headlong into the Virginia view on the
standard of care required of children. The deceased, a boy of
thirteen, was killed while riding a motorcycle in violation of an
oidinance declaring it unlawful "... . for any such person to ride,
or be transported upon, any such vehicle unless he or she occupies a regular seat."120 In dealing with this question the court
said:
16 196 Va.678, 85 S.E.2d 223 (1955).

17 161 Va.228, 234, 170 S.E. 836, 838, (1933).
18 192 Va.479, 485, 487, 65 S.E.2d 547, (1951).
19 197 Va.572, 90 S.E.2d 171 (1955).
20 d. at 573, 90 S.E.2d at 173.

Virginia applies the rule that the violation of a statute or
ordinance by an adult is negligence per se. Yet it adheres to
the principle that an infant between the age of seven and
fourteen years is prima facie presumed incapable of negligence. Wash. v. Holland, 166 Va. 45, 183 S.E. 236.21
The court then ruled that the defendant was entitled to an
instruction embodying these principles, thus allowing the jury to
construct its own standard of care to be required of the deceased
boy of thirteen, with the standard of the ordinance serving merely
as a guide, subject to the general law concerning the negligence
of infants.
Death by Wrongful Act. (A) Damages. In Gough v.
Shaner, Admr., the defendant argued upon appeal that no pe.
cuniary loss was suffered by his statutory beneficiaries, because
he was only thirteen years old, and there was no proof he had
earned anything in the past or was earning anything when killed.
Further, the defendant asserted that the phrase "fixing such sum
with reference to the probable earnings of the deceased . . .
taking into consideration his age, intelligence, and health during
what would have been his probable lifetime if he had not been
killed,"3 was error in an instruction and prejudicial because (a)
there was no proof of earnings, and (b) decedent's life expectancy
had not been proved by mortality tables or other evidence.
The Supreme Court of Appeals pointed out that Section 8--36
of the Code of Virginia allows the jury to award within the
the statutory limit such damages as "to it may appear fair and
just", and that the court has historically given the phrase "fair and
just" a broad and liberal construction.24 The court reviewed

authorities in Virginia and other states, and concluded that it is
not necessary that a child have earned money or have a present
earning capacity for his statutory beneficiaries to suffer pecuniary loss because of his death. 25 Further, the court found that
when the age, sex, health and mental capacity of the decedent
21
22
23
24

Id. at 576, 90 S.E.2d at 175.
See note 19 supra.
Id. at 578, 90 S.E.2d at 176.
Matthews v. Warner, 29 Grat. 570, 573, 70 Va. 570 (1877).
Matthews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 118, 87 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1955).

25 Cooke v. Griggs, 183 Va. 851, 33 S.E.2d 764; Ratcliffe v. McDonald
Admr., 123 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 307, 308 (1918).

are proved,
it is not essential that mortality tables be proved in
20
the case.
The decision is in accord with past decisions in this area of
the law.
Death by Wrongful Act. (B) Right of Adulterous Wife
to Share in Recovery. The right of a wife who is living
in adultery at the time of her husband's death to share in the
recovery had never been squarely before the court prior to the
case of Mattbews v. Hicks.2 7 It had been decided, however, that

a statute 28 which bars a wife who wilfully deserts or abandons her
husband from all interest in his estate as a tenant by dower, distributee or otherwise, does not preclude her from sharing in a
recovery for his wrongful death.29 In view of the failure of
passage of legislationo which would have barred the adulterous
spouse, the court declined to hold that he or she is barred. The
court pointed out, however, that ".

.

. if evidence of satisfactory

conjugal relations is admissible to show the loss sustained by a
surviving spouse, then evidence that such relations have in fact
been terminated is admissible for the consideration of the jury
in determining what is a fair and just amount to award an unfaithful spouse for the loss of the mate." 31 Accordingly, the
court ruled that such evidence is admissible on the issue of quantum of damages, unless the evidence clearly shows a reconciliation.
One sympathizes with the court's reluctance to declare a
rule of law which has been specifically foregone by the Legislature. And it is safe to feel that on this issue, defendants have
nothing to fear from ".

.

. the enlightened conscience of impar-

tial jurors, guided by all the facts and circumstances of the particular case."'32 The difficulty in this solution, however, lies in
Section 8-636, which provides that "nothing shall be apportioned
to the parents, brothers and sisters of the deceased, if there be a
surviving widow or husband .. ." In a hypothetical case wherein
Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 580, 90 S.E.2d 171, 177 (1955).
197 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955).
28
Va. Code S64-35, (1950).
29 Mitchell v. Kennedy, 166 Va. 346, 186 S.E. 40 (1936).
80 House Bill No. 205, House journal 1950, p. 157.
31 Matthews v. Hicks,' 197 Va. 112, 121, 87 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1955).
82 Simmons v. McConnell, 86 Va. 494, 497, 10 S.E. 838, 839 (1890).
20
27

the decedent is survived by an adulterous spouse and by parents,
brothers, or sisters, who by family association and solicitude are
deserving, there appears to be no way whereby the recovery may
be apportioned to them. An analogous situation is that in which
the sole beneficiary in the first class is a spouse whose contributory negligence bars him or her from sharing in the recovery. 3
Here also Section 8-636 bars an apportionment to those who
comprise the second class-parents, brothers, and sisters.
The solution to this problem which most readily presents itself is (1) an amendment to our statute which would bar a spouse
who is shown to have been living in adultery at the time of the
death of the decedent, and (2) a revision of the language of Section 8-636 to allow an apportionment to parents, brothers and
sisters of the decedent in the event the sole beneficiary in the
first class is a person who is barred by law from sharing in the
recovery.
It is, therefore, most desirable that the Legislature deal with
the problem, which, while possibly rare, is nevertheless capable
of inflicting very real hardship.
Surface Water-Defendant Liable for Pouring Upon
Plaintiff's Land. Hodges Manor Corp. v. Mayflower Park
Corp.s was a case wherein the plaintiff sought damages for injuries inflicted by defendant when he collected surface water into
an artificial channel and poured it upon the plaintiff's land. The
case was decided upon principles well settled in Virginia, where
the common-law rule upon the subject prevails.8 The essence
of the decision is contained in the language which the court
quoted from the Carter case, 91 Va. 587 at page 592, 593:
Where the common law rule is in force, as in this state,
surface water is considered a common enemy, and the
courts agree that each landowner may fight it off as best he
Richmond, etc., Co. v. Martin, 102 Va. 201, 45 S.E. 894 (1903); Reid v.
Medley, 118 Va. 462, 87 S.E. 616 (1916); Ratcliffe v. McDonald Adm'r.,
123 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 907 (1918).
34 197 Va. 344, 89 S.E.2d 59 (1955).
85Norfolk and Western R.R. Co. v. Carter, 91 Va. 587, 22 S.E. 517 (1895);
Third Buckingham Community v. Anderson, 178 Va. 478, 17 S.E.2d
433 (1941); Mason v. Lamb, 189 Va. 348, 53 S.E.2d 7, 12 A.L.R.2d 1332
(1949); Hamlet v.Soith Norfolk, 193 Va. 564, 69 S.E.2d 346 (1952).

3a

may... This right in regard to surface water may not be
exercised wantonly, unnecessarily, or carelessly; but is
modified by that golden maxim of the law, that one must so
use his own property as not to injure the rights of another. * * 0
The right thus modified has also its exceptions. One exception is that the owner of the land cannot collect the
water into an artificial channel or volume and pour it upon
the land of another to his injury. The right to fend off surface water does not extend that far.
What is a Vehicle? Jesse v. Slate Adm'r.,s" an action for
damages for death by wrongful act, is distinguished by defendant's novel position that although a person riding a horse upon the
highway is subject to the same rules and regulations applicable
to the driver of a motor vehicle, except those provisions which
by their very nature can have no application, 7 drivers of other
vehicles are not under a reciprocal duty to regard the horse and
rider as a vehicle. The court did not dignify this argument with
much discussion, merely pointing to the statute," but in holding
that motorists are under such a duty, the court also repeated the
settled idea that a highway includes the shoulders as well as the
hard surface of the road.m
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. There is general
agreement that the doctrine of last clear chance has had a perplexing history in the courts of Virginia. 40 Also that the difficulty
has centered upon that class of case where the plaintiff has negligently placed himself in a situation of danger from which he
has the ability to remove himself, but fails to do so because he is
inattentive and unconscious of his danger. Specifically, the question has been: Is such a plaintiff entitled to a last clear chance instruction placing liability upon the defendant who "should have
discovered" the plaintiff's peril, or should liability be fastened
upon the defendant only where there is evidence that the defendant actually knew of the plaintiff's position and realized, or had
80 196 Va. 1074, 86 SE.2d 821 (1955).
87 Va. Code, S46-183 (1950).
88 Ibid.
89

Crouse v. Pugh, 188 Va. 156, 49 S.E.2d 421 (1948). Burton v. Oldfield,
195 Va. 544, 79 S.E.2d 660 (1954).
40 Van Dyke, Last Clear Cbance in Virginia, 40 Va. L. Rev. 637 (1954).

41 The
reason to realize his danger and was thereafter 4negligent?
2
latter view is that adopted by the Restatement.

A further point of difficulty arose because of the failure of
the Supreme Court of Appeals to distinguish between the plaintiff who is physically helpless to remove himself from the danger
and the merely inattentive plaintiff described above, in its application of the rule."
In the past the Court has followed the "humanitarian" doctrine embodying the "should have discovered" concept, and
applied it to both the inattentive and the helpless plaintiff, alike.
The court nevertheless, denied the operation of a last clear chance
instruction to a plaintiff whose negligence was found to be a
"continuing" or "proximate cause, as distinguished from a remote
cause". This position has been attacked as a rationalization of
comparative negligence notions. 4
This was the state of the law when Hopson v. Goolsby"
was decided on March 7, 1955. In this case the plaintiff was
struck when she was crossing a street in the middle of a block,
having failed to look before she started across the street and
failing to keep a proper lookout as she crossed. On these facts the
court held that she was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law, that the "doctrine of last clear chance does not supersede
the defense of contributory negligence, and a plaintiff who is
guilty of contributory negligence cannot recover in any event.'"4
Hence, the court ruled, an instruction on last clear chance was
error, especially since ".... the burden is on the plaintiff to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in what he did or failed to do after he discovered or should
have discovered that the plaintiff was in a situation of helpless or
unconscious peril.' 4 7 [Italics supplied] Thus it is clear that the
court decided this case under the humanitarian concept and,
further that the court made no distinction between the helpless
and the unconscious (inattentive) victim, at least in its pronouncement of the rule.
4 1

Note, 40 Va. L. Rev. 666 at 673 (1954).

4 Restatement, Torts, $480 (1934).
4

Anderson v. Payne, 189 Va. 712, 54 S.E.2d 82 (1949).

44 ld.at 727, 54 S..2d at 89.
45 196 Va. 832, 86 S.E.2d 149 (1955).
4d.

at 839, 86 S.E. at 154.

47 ld.at 840, 86 S.Y. at 154.

Hodgson v. McCall,48 decided on June 13, 1955, was strikingly'
similar to the Hopson case on the facts, and a similar result was
reached, the court ruling that the actions of the lower court in
striking plaintiff's evidence and refusing plaintiff's instruction
was proper.
On September 14, 1955, the court made a definitive clarification of the rule to be applied to cases wherein the negligent
plaintiff was not helpless but merely unconscious of his danger.
In Greer v. Noland Co.,49 the plaintiff was standing a foot off the
paved portion of a highway, talking to occupants of a parked
vehicle, when he was struck by the bed of a truck which protruded beyond the sides of the cab of the truck. The driver of
the truck testified that he had seen the plaintiff standing in that
position while about a quarter of a mile distant from him, that he
did not slacken his speed, sound his horn, or move from the right
hand lane of the highway.
Recognizing the need for a "more precise method of applying the last clear chance doctrine"' in this class of case, the court
adopted the following rule:
Where the injured person has negligently placed himself
in a situation of peril from which he is physically unable to
remove himself, the defendant is liable if he saw, or should
have seen, him in time to avert the accident by using reasonable care. Where the plaintiff has negligently placed himself
in a situation of peril from which he is physically able to
remove himself but is unconscious of his peril, the defendant
is liable only if he saw the plaintiff and realized, or ought
to have realized, his peril in time to avert the accident by
using reasonable care. 51
52
This view is substantially that of the Restatement.

Duty Towards Infants and Children of Tender Age.
Jury Question. Conrad v. Taylor53 was an action for damages
4 197 Va. 52, 87 S.E.2d 791 (1955).
49 197 Va. 233, 89 S.E.2d 49 (1955).
50 Id. at 238, 89 S.E.2d at 53.
512 Id. at 239, 89 S.E.2d at 53.
0 See Note 41 supra.
"197

Va. 188, 192; 89 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1955).

for the death of a three-year-old child who had been playing in
front of the defendant's car and was killed when the latter drove
off. On appeal from an adverse verdict, the defendant contended
that the plaintiff had failed to make out a case of negligence as a
matter of law, citing White v. Edwards Chevrolet Co.1 wherein
the court quoted the following language from Michie's Law of
Automobiles, 1938 Ed., Section 96, pp. 229, 230, "A driver is under no legal obligation to make a search around and under his
car lest a child too young for discretion and undirected by parents
has tucked himself away in an obscure place, beyond the usual
and convenient notice of the driver."
The Court distinguished the White case from the case at bar
in that in the White case ".'. . there was no evidence on which a
jury could have concluded that an ordinarily prudent person in
the situation occupied by Davis would have been on notice that
the deceased child might be in or near the truck at the time it
was moved." 55 On the other hand, in the case at bar, ". . . the
facts and circumstances of the instant case presented a question
for the jury as to whether the driver should have made a reasonable inspection to determine whether he could move his car
without injury to the three young children he knew were playing
around the car almost immediately before he started."" Thus, the
factor of notice, and the time elapsing between the notice and the
starting of the vehicle were sufficient to raise a jury question as
to the duty owed the child by the driver.
Wilful or Wantan Negligence. Duty to Trespasser.
In Bo'ward v. Leftwich57 plaintiff was suing for damages for the
death of his decedent, who had been picked up by defendant's
driver in violation of the defendant's orders. Under established
Virginia law, plaintiff's decedent was, therefore, a trespasser, who
could recover only for willful or wanton injury."" The driver's
negligence consisted of looking down at the floor of the truck in
an effort to get the truck into gear. While he was so engaged,
Va. 669,43 S.E.2d 870 (1947).
197 Va. 188, 89 S.E.2d 40 (1955).
56 Id. at 193, 89 S.E.2d at 43.
5t 197 Va. 227, 89 S.E.2d 32 (1955).
58 Morris v. Dame's Ex'r., 161 Va. 545, 572 if, 171 S.E. 662-673 (1933); Stone
v. Rudolph, 137 W.Va. 335, 32 S.E.2d 742 (1944).
54186
5

the truck went off the road, overturned, and the rider was killed.
It was held that this was not willful or wanton negligence.
The court quoted the following from American Jurisprudence: "Willfulness or wantoness imparts premeditation or
knowledge and consciousness that injury is likely to result from
the act done or from the omission to act... Wanton misconduct
is positive in nature, while mere negligence is materially nega-

tive ...
Lawrence L. Lieberman

59 38 Am. Jut. Negligence, $48 (1941).

